

# Is Conducting Research Experiments Using Animals Wrong?

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**ABSTRACT:** *For decades, the subject of vigorous discussion has been the use of animals in research and to test the safety of goods. Centered on the data gathered by F. Barbara Orlans in her book "In the Interest of Science" 60% of all animals used for testing are used for veterinary research and product safety testing. People have varying emotions about animals; many see animals as pets, while some see animals as a way to advance medicinal methods or to further scientific study. However people interpret animals, the truth remains that animals are abused all over the country and around the globe by testing laboratories and cosmetics firms. While humans often benefit from effective animal testing, the potential human gains are not worth the misery and death of animals. Animals should also not be used in testing or to assess the safety of goods.*

**KEYWORDS:** *Physiological Capabilities, Animal Welfare, Animal Experiments, Animal Rights.*

## INTRODUCTION

My intention is to explain to you why, in scientific science, some theorist's think that the use of animals is incorrect, even though the research concerned provides important results for humans or other animals and even though the methods involved are humane. Their point is straightforward: using non-consenting human beings as study subjects in such experiments will be false. Provided that human and nonhuman animals have similar psychological and physiological capabilities, the use of nonhuman animals would not be incorrect. It is just arbitrary bigotry to believe that using non-consenting human beings is incorrect, but the right to use non-human animals is wrong. When a person is used to create benefits for another, according to the American philosopher Tom Regan, they are inevitably harmed in the process, regardless of whether they undergo pain or suffering, or are eventually destroyed [1].

The wrongness of using people in testing is exacerbated by pain and suffering and mortality, but these sources of harm are in addition to, or inferior to, the primary cause of harm. The primary type of damage is merely to be considered a viable testing instrument, something whose well-being or health, meaning and life are considered to be derivative of one's utility for the research concerned [2]. Therefore, we should understand the major ethical issue for Regan as, 'is the experimental subject viewed in ways that mean that its well-being or health, meaning and life are less important than the research objectives? I would support this stance by making a central or 'generic' case for animal welfare in the interest of promoting discussion.

While some philosophers of animal rights may disagree with concrete aspects of the claim as I put it, it is fair to assume that most of the first three principles would support at least. I will try as much as possible to escape metaphysical jargon, but at the beginning, there is one difference that I would like to make explicit [3]. This is the contrast that philosophers make between the 'descriptive' of how the world is on the one side, and the 'normative' or how the world should be on the other hand. The disparity between reality and principles is often referred to as this distinction. The key interest of scientists is to uncover scientific evidence and confirm theories about them [4]. In comparison, moral theorists are concerned with normative principles and whether specific practices adhere to ethical criteria aimed at fostering or honoring these ideals. This disparity in focus between scientists and philosophers is important because it illustrates that the bare fact that a practice is universal shows certain moral philosophers little of its moral validity in itself [2]. The fact that slavery was common and tolerated during numerous periods throughout history, for instance, does not prove that it was then or now justified.

Similarly, to explain the Australian Code of Practice, the fact that the use of animals in testing could have broad public acceptance is not adequate. Of course, the fact that a practice is common may be an indication of its permissibility—society may have the ethics right and the practice may be justified—but the argument is that it is not morally acceptable in itself by the sheer fact that a practice is ingrained. To decide whether a procedure is morally acceptable for philosophers, we need to expose it to rational reasoning, just as a scientist would use an analytical approach to test a theory [3]. Any individuals may be a little skeptical of the critical thought approach that philosophers use to examine the morality of current activities. Philosophers also use 'thought experiments'—exercises of reasoning that rely on conceptual or counter-factual scenarios in attempting to decide if a particular activity is ethically justified. There is nothing mystical about logical reasoning strategies like that. As long as it is known that there is a substantial contrast in evidence and values, and that scientists have at least certain ethical restrictions on them in pursuit of truth, so participating in thought experiments can be interpreted as just the way of a philosopher to test a theory in conjunction with an investigative process similar to that used by researchers. By objective observation, scientists test theories; philosophers test ideas by reasoning objectively about them.

## **PRACTICALITIES OF GATHERING AND ANALYZING THE NECESSARY DETAILS**

A checklist, 'Compliance with ethical criteria for animal experiments,' will be completed by the authors, showing that they have given the appropriate details and will be needed to include this information in the template of the manuscript's Methodology section. This should promote its exploration and add to openness by reviewers and readers [4]. The reasoning behind this is that, because there is an easy way for the writers to include it, the critics use it to analyze it and the readers use it to judge the writing, the process of suggesting the addition of such details is futile. The material needs to be in the article and not merely in the review archives of the publication. We would incorporate a new and additional element of peer-review to ensure that this is

adequately 'policed,' requiring a team of experts whose task will be to review all aspects relevant to animal studies. The key data to be captured is:

- a. More robust data on the laboratory architecture of animal experiments.
- b. Rationale for choosing an experimental model.
- c. Clearer legal and ethical system information and adoption by Ethics Committees.
- d. More info on the welfare of animals.

Most of this concerns good execution of experiments and sufficient statistical interpretation. For starters, assuming that fewer experiments actually yield better research is a common mistake. One of the most important mistakes we see in the study is that very few trials lead to under-powered tests that do not lead to sound results and therefore involve more long-term experiments to explain false leads.

### OBJECTION AND RESPONSES

By insisting that humans and other species are not equally eligible, the philosophers who say that the call for animal rights is a symbol of moral decadence refute premise of the case. They argue that there will be something unique about the submission of a post-graduate research applicant that is a human being that separates them, and this point alone further helps to illustrate that humans and non-human animals are not 'like instances.' Nor should it be all that relevant to the bare truth that a candidate is a human being? Is the membership of organisms alone a socially relevant distinction between human and nonhuman animals? If, like all of you in all related ways, there was an articulate alien willing to fulfill all the expected criteria of a postgraduate researcher but missing our DNA, would it be appropriate to refuse their application to the research program merely because they lacked your DNA? In such a scenario, wouldn't DNA be as meaningless as height or eye colour or ethnicity in a line in a supermarket? What if the claimant is an individual of the extinct species *Homo Flores*, proof of which has recently been discovered in Indonesia? And if they were not *Homo sapiens*, it makes sense to name them 'individuals,' and, as far as anyone can say, they were similar enough, but not identical to humans.

Philosophers in animal welfare justify hypothesis two by arguing that it is not merely being human that makes an existence worthwhile or decides how to handle an individual, but rather the psychological ability of the individual involved[5]. This is a belief commonly held by those of the medical and science communities, but perhaps by many who adhere to beliefs synonymous with Christianity, judging by activities such as primate studies, human embryonic stem cell research, abortion and voluntary euthanasia. In the Christian perspective, the underlying argument of the animal rights movement is implicitly supported by those who advocate fetal stem-cell testing, abortion and voluntary euthanasia - that the meaning of life should not be focused on membership of organisms but rather on psychological capacities. But should all human life be deemed as important as Christian education enjoins us to believe? Should we

claim there are useful lives for citizens in chronically vegetative conditions or irreversible comas? Would we claim that the life of a 4-week-old fetus or a zygote is precious merely because it is a *Homo sapiens*? It is to be committed to the belief that irreversible coma patients and zygotes have precious lives worth saving, regardless of the psychological skills involved in them, to assume that all human life is valuable[6].

The consequence of such a view is that it is profoundly incorrect to turn off life support systems and use surplus IVF embryos in stem-cell science. There may be a valid explanation for indefinitely keeping coma patients alive and protecting the lives of zygotes, but it probably isn't just because they're *Homo sapiens*. Speaking of situations such as the intellectual alien, *Homo Flores*, comatose humans, zygotes, human embryonic stem-cell and primate experiments would indicate that it is not only being human that defines how beings can be treated; instead, it is the psychological existence of a being that appears to underpin its spiritual value. If this is so, it would appear that membership of the genus itself cannot be cited as a socially valid distinction between humans and other animals.

## CONCLUSION

For those scholars who take rational claims seriously, the fundamental case for animal welfare raises a threat. By identifying a socially significant difference between humans and other species which may act as a basis for the present double standard between humans and animals as test subjects, the challenge is to undermine the assumption. For those that so far have attempted, this has been a daunting task. A working group comprising biologists, veterinarians, philosophers and animal rights members was appointed by the British Council on Medical Ethics in the late 1980s to study current ethical and moral discussion regarding animal experiments. The committee concluded that it was unlikely that a justifiable legal justification of the double standard can be found. Frey, the leading ethical critic of animal welfare, said, "The problem is that if we cannot separate human and animal cases completely, in a morally significant way, then we must either endorse some version of animal research on humans or stop animal research, whether in an immediate or progressive way." In this context, the case against the use of animals in testing, as I have long believed, is better than most people allow, in the sense in which the claim for animal rights looms large.

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