

TERRORISM AFFECTED BY MEDIA'S ATTENTION

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ABSTRACT: *This paper tests the causal link between the media's exposure to terrorism and subsequent attacks. Analyzing 61,132 days of attack in 201 countries provides proof that expanded coverage of the New York Times facilitates more attacks in the same region. Using natural disasters in the United States as an exogenous variance that decreases media coverage, the correlation tends to be causal. An additional article is recommended to generate 1.4 assaults during the next week, which is equal to an estimate of three casualties. This finding is robust to several alternate assessments and it seems unlikely that the attacks will merely be delayed. If terrorists do not gain national coverage, fewer would be targeted.*

KEYWORDS: *NYT, media, terrorism, victim of terrorism, fake news, caution, impact.*

INTRODUCTION

It's been suggested that terrorist organizations systematically seek media coverage to spread their message, create fear, and recruit followers. Most of the time, attacks are not even directly aimed toward specific victims but are rather conducted to scare and convey a message. Thus, it's possible that when the media is listening a terrorist organization may seek to take advantage of that platform and continue their attacks. The subsequent pages present empirical evidence that supports this hypothesis[1].

Media in its different structures can assume a significant part in political clash circumstances. Radio, TV, also, paper inclusion can spike or prevent political savagery; it tends to be utilized as a publicity apparatus or essentially as an amplifier to spread data across an enormous crowd. For example, radio projects may have assumed a vital job in the ascent of the Nazis the Rwandan slaughter, or the new ascent of patriot hostile to Serbian gatherings in Croatia. Be that as it may, less consideration has been committed to a possibly causal connection between media inclusion and psychological warfare, albeit various observers have recommended such elements (e.g., see Rather, 2012. In August 2016, at that point Secretary of State John Kerry commented that "perhaps the media would do us each of an administration on the off chance that they didn't cover it very as much".

In reality, terrorism has become a well-liked news topic: media outlets worldwide dedicate TV marathons, front-page headlines, and in-depth portraits to terrorist groups. In fact, the extent of the media coverage terrorist organizations receive (free of charge) has been compared to the “advertising budgets of a number of the world’s largest corporations”[2]. It’s possible that people’s irrational fear of terrorism is, a minimum of partially, owed to such media exposure. Half the US population is worried that they or their family are going to be a victim of terrorism, albeit the odds of dying at the hands of a terrorist are approximately equal to drowning in one’s own bathtub. Similarly, consistent with a World Values Survey study [3] people worldwide worry more about terrorism than losing their job, a war involving their country, or a war.

A significant differentiation between the media's part in psychological warfare and the contention settings talked about above identifies with the suggested instrument. In the individual clash settings, the media can encourage the spread of purposeful publicity and data to impact individuals' political perspectives furthermore, convictions. Fear based oppressor associations, in any case, pick "their planning to amplify media consideration" and may strike more when media consideration is on them. Along these lines, media inclusion isn't really utilized unequivocally to propel explicit objectives (which may likewise be conceivable, be that as it may) however psychological oppressor gatherings may expect to misuse the media stage they at present have. Strangely, this objective of boosting media inclusion may remain interestingly governments' craving to assault 'when the world isn't watching', as proposed by Durante and Zhuravskaya (2015) in their new examination on the Israeli-Palestinian clash.

A natural question to ask then is whether or not media coverage of terrorism carries direct consequences for the behavior of terrorist groups[4]. Once within the spotlight, terrorist groups may prefer to exploit this exposure to further spread their message, create fear, and recruit followers. Thus, presumably unintended consequences of covering terrorism may end in encouraging terrorists to continue attacking[5]. If this were the case, society could draw several conclusions. For example, self-imposed restrictions are powerful drivers within the media industry concerning other topics, like the sensible and limited coverage of suicides or the coverage of so-called “suckergenerally, media coverage of terrorism (like coverage of other issues) might be demand- and/or supply-driven, where the demand side relates to consumer preferences and therefore the supply side is commonly related to the preferences of media ownerspunches[6].” One could imagine similar arrangements for the coverage of terrorism, raising awareness within the media industry[7]. Other, more drastic options include policies that regulate the coverage of terrorist attacks.

Unfortunately, it's been proven difficult to empirically test the systematic interplay between media attention and terrorism, not to mention studies allowing a causal interpretation. Additionally to limited data availability and comparability, persistent endogeneity concerns have

plagued such studies.³ the subsequent pages attempt to take one step therein direction, studying a sample of 61,132 attack days in 201 countries from 1970 to 2012. First, I derive a measure for the international media attention each attack day receives within the New York Times (NYT). Then, this measure of media coverage as a predictor of upcoming attacks within the same country. To isolate causality, natural disasters within the (US) provide an exogenous variation, decreasing media attention dedicated to contemporary terrorist attacks within the remainder of the planet[8]. Such events convince be a robust predictor of the media coverage terrorist attacks receive in the NYT, but are unlikely connected to non-US based terrorist organizations through other meaningful channels[9].

The findings produce quantitative evidence supporting the hypothesis that media attention dedicated to terrorism actively encourages subsequent attacks. The results from instrumental variable estimations reveal a strong positive effect of NYT coverage on the amount of subsequent attacks within the same country. The magnitude of the derived relationship suggests that one additional article increases the amount of attacks within the following week by approximately 1.4. This corresponds to about three casualties on average.

These results account for the inclusion of a comprehensive set of control variables, like the detailed characteristics of the initial attack, country fixed effects, country-specific time trends, and country-year fixed effects for countries most notorious for terrorism, 2 within the case of suicides, it's recommended to “decide whether to report,” “modify or remove information which will increase risk,” and “present information about suicide in ways in which could also be helpful”. Indeed, the media appears to possess found a wise thanks to report on suicides, usually pertaining to “incidents” and wisely choosing words that are unlikely to encourage copycats. Within the case of “sucker punches” or “king hits”, an ample discussion in Australia about labeling sudden knockout punches as an act of cowardice has cause a change in language by the media. Suggest positive Granger causality between terrorist attacks and media attention, counting the word “terrorism” within the Times (NYT) with 87 monthly observations. In addition to economic, political, and social aspects. Further, I find no evidence that decreased media attention, due to a natural disaster occurring within the US, merely postpones attacks. Thus, less press coverage may indeed cause fewer terrorist attacks overall and not just affect their timing.

The paper aims to contribute too many areas of research. First, it suggests a strategy for systematically collecting data on media coverage of specific terrorist attacks and isolating the causal effect on subsequent actions. Within the spirit of, who analyze the effect of media coverage on disaster aid, researchers could also be ready to better investigate the results of media coverage. Second, regarding data collection and availability, the paper provides an example of

how we will use internet archives to systematically derive data that are readily available for analyzing timely questions.

Third, the paper adds to the growing literature on the consequences of media coverage. Especially, the media has been shown to influence economic and political deciding, such as consumer decisions or voting behavior. Fourth and final, the paper adds to our understanding of the determinants of terrorism. Although media attention has long been speculated to provide an incentive for terrorists' strategies, this paper provides quantitative evidence using 43 years of knowledge on 61,132 attack days.

CONCLUSION

This paper introduces a strategy for evaluating causal links between media attention and subsequent terrorist attacks. Using the NYT as a representative international media outlet, I derive a proxy for media coverage dedicated to individual attack days, creating 61,132.

Dependent variable: Worldwide number of attacks on day t observations on the country-day level between 1970 and 2012. In a conventional OLS analysis, NYT coverage remains a statistically insignificant and quantitatively negligible predictor of future attacks in the same country. However, substantial endogeneity problems are likely contaminating this result as variety of characteristics may influence both terrorism and its media attention in either direction.

To isolate causality, I exploit natural disasters within the US as an exogenous variation that decreases media attention dedicated to contemporaneous terrorist attacks conducted elsewhere within the world. In a 2SLS framework, NYT coverage emerges as a positive and sizeable determinant of future attacks – a result that's statistically significant at the one-hundredth level. One additional NYT article is usually recommended to cause 1.4 additional attacks within the upcoming week, which translates to approximately three casualties on the average. Thus, providing terrorists with a world media platform may encourage further terrorism. This result's robust to variety of other estimations, extensions, and robustness checks. Further, I find no evidence that terrorists merely postpone their missions if coverage is reduced unexpectedly. If anything, the amount of attacks remains lower for up to 60 days. In general, these results provide quantitative evidence that media coverage may encourage further terrorist attacks, a conclusion that advises against elevated media coverage of terrorism. Analyzing a long-term sample of 43 years and 201 countries, this study evaluates the media-terrorism link in its most general form. The disadvantage of this scope is that search terms within the media got to be general and comparable across time and space. Thus, promising future studies may specialize in particular conflict zones, allowing a more refined measure of media attention and therefore the underlying dynamics of terrorism. Similarly, a content analysis of how the media reports on terrorism and potential consequences would likely produce fruitful insights.

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